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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: PROPOSAL: Cluster 19 - NTCONFIG (13 candidates)
================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0499 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF NETBIOS share information may be published through SNMP registry keys in NT. VOTE: ACCEPT ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0534 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT user has inappropriate rights or privileges, e.g. Act as System, Add Workstation, Backup, Change System Time, Create Pagefile, Create Permanent Object, Create Token Name, Debug, Generate Security Audit, Increase Priority, Increase Quota, Load Driver, Lock Memory, Profile Single Process, Remote Shutdown, Replace Process Token, Restore, System Environment, Take Ownership, or Unsolicited Input. VOTE: ACCEPT ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0535 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT account policy for passwords has inappropriate, security-critical settings, e.g. for password length, password age, or uniqueness. VOTE: MODIFY Perhaps this could be re-worded a bit. The CVE CAN-1999-00582 specifies "...settings for lockouts". To remain consistent with the other, maybe it should specify "...settings for passwords" I think most people would agree that passwords should be at least 8 characters; contain letters (upper and lowercase), numbers and at least one non-alphanumeric; should only be good a limited time 30-90 days; and should not contain character combinations from user's prior 2 or 3 passwords. Suggested rewrite - A Windows NT account policy does not enforce reasonable minimum security-critical settings for passwords, e.g. passwords of sufficient length, periodic required password changes, or new password uniqueness ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0546 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF The Windows NT guest account is enabled. VOTE: ACCEPT ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0562 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF The registry in Windows NT can be accessed remotely by users who are not administrators. VOTE: ACCEPT ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0572 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF ..reg files are associated with the Windows NT registry editor, making the registry susceptible to Trojan Horse attacks. VOTE: ACCEPT ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0575 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT system's user audit policy does not log an event success or failure, e.g. for Logon and Logoff, File and Object Access, Use of User Rights, User and Group Management, Security Policy Changes, Restart, Shutdown, and System, and Process Tracking. VOTE: REVIEWING ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0576 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT system's file audit policy does not log an event success or failure for security-critical files or directories. VOTE: ACCEPT ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0577 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT system's file audit policy does not log an event success or failure for non-critical files or directories. VOTE: REVIEWING ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0578 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT system's registry audit policy does not log an event success or failure for security-critical registry keys. VOTE: ACCEPT ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0579 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT system's registry audit policy does not log an event success or failure for non-critical registry keys. VOTE: ACCEPT ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0582 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT account policy has inappropriate, security-critical settings for lockout, e.g. lockout duration, lockout after bad logon attempts, etc. VOTE: MODIFY Maybe a rewording of this one too. I think most people would agree on some "minimum" policies like 3-5 bad attempts lockout for an hour or until the administrator unlocks the account. Suggested rewrite - A Windows NT account policy does not enforce reasonable minimum security-critical settings for lockouts, e.g. lockout duration, lockout after bad logon attempts, etc. ================================= Candidate: CAN-1999-0585 Published: Final-Decision: Interim-Decision: Modified: Announced: 19990721 Assigned: 19990607 Category: CF A Windows NT administrator account has the default name of Administrator. VOTE: REJECT There are ways to identify the administrator account anyway, so this is only a minor delay to someone that is knowledgeable. This, in and of itself, doesn't really strike me as a vulnerability, anymore than the root account on a Unix box. ================================== ------------------------------------------------------------ David W. Baker INFOSEC Engineer bakerd@mitre.org G023 - Secure Information Technology (703) 883-3658 The MITRE Corporation (703) 883-1397 FAX 1820 Dolley Madison Blvd, Mailstop W422 McLean, VA, 22102 ------------------------------------------------------------
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